Rethinking defence

I must apologise for my short absence from blogging. I’ve been on an actual holiday. Notionally we were at Elveden Center Parcs, but you’ll not be remotely surprised to learn I spent the whole time at the end of RAF Lakenheath runway snapping pictures of F15Es. I’ve never been happier.

That, though, has put me very much in a defence frame of mind and so I’m doing some provisional work on the Homeland Party defence policy. In this, I could very easily get caught up in interminable debates about individual items of kit, but as I’ve often observed, procurement of equipment in contingent on knowing who you are fighting and where. As such, these debates are pointless without first establishing defence and foreign policy posture.

That much is a conversation for another time, but there are still other issues that need to be addressed independently of equipment and foreign policy. The problems we have with the armed forces are as much a product of command culture.

For want of a better word, British armed forces in recent years have undergone a blobification process, towards a managerial culture that embraces DEI, corporate HR dogma, climate activism and political correctness. We have seen a similar process in the police force which has demolished force effectiveness. Staff officers in particular have become a new breed of decorated bureaucrat with little in the way of genuine leadership skills.

The MoD has integrated climate goals into its operations, such as committing to net-zero emissions by 2050. Initiatives include exploring greener technologies for military vehicles and reducing the carbon footprint of bases. The officer corps is marinated in such dogma, to the extent that these objectives take precedence over combat effectiveness. Promotions increasingly reward administrative skills and compliance with institutional priorities over battlefield leadership or strategic innovation. The armed forces' promotion system favours risk-averse, process-driven officers, potentially sidelining those with unconventional or bold leadership styles.

This corporatisation can be found across the defence establishment. The UK’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme should be focussed on delivering the best bang for our bucks, but instead is compelled to outline steps to reduce carbon emissions and promote sustainable practices. The RAF website boasts its intention to:

"Maximise contribution to society by making demonstrable and measurable progress against the UK’s Social Value Model and contribute to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. This includes inspire the next generation through sustainability awareness in support of STEM training, align with industry and MoD gender equality targets, invest in carbon technologies and develop sustainability skill sets across the UK."

Elsewhere the RAF asserts :

"Energy resilience also plays a major role in the RAF’s target to reduce its emissions towards net zero. This showcase highlighted how the transition to decarbonise also mutually provides the opportunity to generate, store and distribute mission critical energy using new, clean energy technologies. This allows stations to create their own energy on or near to sites, and enables defence to operate off-grid for periods of time in the event of power outages or future conflict."

The MoD and the officer corps is marinated in this stuff. Defence and security are a distant second to fashionable social and political agendas. Rising through the ranks depends on learning the language of diversity and sustainability, and demonstrating conformity to modern corporate doctrines. As such, the armed forces are losing touch with what they are actually for.

Meanwhile, RUSI points to the growth of an overly burdensome safety regime which is restricting opportunities for the British Army to train at scale. This poses risks of higher casualties and reduced capability if it is called on to fight a war, and of reducing safety through undermining confidence. Essentially, our armed forces are being micromanaged by bureaucrats and run as civilian institutions.

While the armed forces have a duty of care against sex discrimination, bullying, and unsafe practices, it’s an inherently hazardous, male dominated profession that simply does not work to civilian norms – nor could it. RUSI notes that there is an imbalance between safety and realism – a culture that has evolved in peacetime. Faced with questions from lawyers, the media and Parliament after training fatalities, senior officers and their political masters are under strong pressure to ensure paper trails to cover backs in enquiries, coroners’ courts and civil action, even at the expense of delivering demanding, realistic training – and indeed the best approach to safety.

What arises for this is an officer corps primarily tasked with civilian administrative chores and compliance tasks, which can only dilute command effectiveness. RUSI argues for a lighter rulebook and greater delegated discretion. Clearly though, there must be a clean sweep to correct the culture in our armed forces.

In this, we must look across the Atlantic for inspiration. President Trump recently signed an Executive Order to restore merit and lethality to America’s fighting force. The Executive Order, titled "Restoring America's Fighting Force," signed January, 2025, aims to eliminate race- and sex-based preferences and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs within the U.S. Armed Forces, Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Coast Guard.

Obviously we must adopt similar measures, but it’s going to require a lot more. The culture of institutions cannot be changed at the stroke of a pen. Net Zero and UNSDG targets are as much of a problem. These political goals should never have been allowed to take root in defence. A comprehensive DOGE style review of special projects within the MoD will be required, not least the elimination of Net Zero programmes.

By the same, token, it will also require the dismissal of indoctrinated civil servants and top brass if found unable to adapt to the new mission. We must implement a new command level curriculum focussed entirely on leadership and combat effectiveness.

Recruitment

Recruitment and retention problems are also a recurring theme in most areas of public service. This is especially true in defence. Defence Secretary John Healey acknowledged the scale of the problem during a session with the Defence Committee. Healey confirmed that for 2024, the Armed Forces have been losing 300 more full-time personnel each month than they have been recruiting. Recruitment targets were set and missed every year; in the last year, service morale fell to record lows.

The MOD has struggled to streamline the recruitment process, with many applicants abandoning their applications due to delays. Over the past decade, more than a million young people applied to join the Armed Forces, but over three-quarters gave up before reaching the point of acceptance or rejection. There are serious delays in medical assessments.

Though the Army takes some of the blame, privatisation of the recruitment process has been shambolic. Capita prioritised chasing revenue, only interested in booking additional contracts. Capita has since lost the contract but has been replaced by another notorious government contractor. Serco . The government hopes that the first-ever tri-service recruitment service will provide a streamlined, single-entry point for prospective recruits, “with the aim of attracting the best talent from across the country into the Armed Forces to strengthen national security”.

I’m of the view that there should be no private sector role in forces recruitment. The armed services should be an attractive career proposition in its own right. The problem is a widening disconnect between the general public and our armed services, where civilian exposure to the armed forces is minimal.

In recent years we have seen public outreach scaled back considerably. Covid was used as an excuse to close down Yeovilton Air Day, and there are no RAF base open days north of Birmingham. There is now only one official RAF airshow on the event calendar and the RAF makes little effort to showcase their capabilities in the air on or the ground. Gone too are national events such as the Royal Tournament. The Royal Tournament closed to reduce military costs, following the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.

We have also seen a gradual erosion of cadet forces. The value of cadet programmes has long been understood, including their impact on social mobility and the health and wellbeing of young people. They are essential to nurturing a public understanding of military life. But last year the Army Cadet Force budget was cut by 50 per cent .

The Army Cadet Force (ACF) and Combined Cadet Force (CCF) are vital pipelines for recruitment but suffer from underfunding and inconsistent quality. Proper resourcing, including incentives for ex-military personnel to serve as Adult Instructors, is essential. ACF officers, who hold Type B commissions, deserve greater respect from Regular soldiers, recognising their unpaid, critical work.

Cadet training must be engaging, with opportunities for adventurous activities, and the use of older cadets in Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) could be expanded. Establishing CCF units in large state schools, particularly in disadvantaged areas, would tap into prime recruiting grounds.

The Armed Forces as a whole have declined in size but also in cultural significance. As such, the military is no longer one of the binding pillars of society. They no longer have reach into schools, and barely feature in the curriculum.

I’m of the view that cadet forces and public outreach are essential components of any recruitment strategy and a reintroduction of the military into public life is essential. The MoD thinks this is a problem of accountancy, when in fact it is as much a cultural problem. Certainly, there is no desire to enlist in order to fight illegitimate, pointless wars, and no incentive for young while males to defend a country that, in action, despises them. As such, the political culture must change, before we see improvements in recruitment and retention. If a young man is to be motivated to lay down his life for his country, he must be convinced he lives in a homeland.

Finally, the Army’s recruitment and culture must reject “woke” posturing. Britain’s warrior class—predominantly working-class white men from the North, alongside officers from less prominent gentry families—form the backbone of the Regular Army. Recruitment campaigns fixated on diversity and inclusion alienate this core demographic, who prioritize tradition, camaraderie, and service to country. Tailoring the Army’s image to minority preferences risks diluting its appeal to those most likely to enlist. The Army must unapologetically reflect the values and aesthetics of its traditional recruits, ensuring it remains a force Englishmen are proud to fight for.

Disintegration

A potentially controversial suggestion put to me is that we must disintegrate the armed forces by sex, recreating the WRNS, WRAC and WAAF. The Armed Forces have a real problem with the sexual (and other) abuse and harassment of servicewomen, as well as sexual misconduct between the sexes. Given the fundamental nature of military service (rank, chain of command, physical proximity of personnel, distance from civilian life, the overwhelming preponderance of men, etc), they are very poorly equipped to deal with it.

Women have a huge dropout and injury rate in training because it is designed for and run by men, and cannot be done any other way without lowering standards and sacrificing capability. Removing women to separate services again largely solves these problems. The old arguments in favour of this remain valid - separate services give women a career path in which their sex is immaterial - as do the many arguments against integration.

There’s no reason for women’s services to be considered junior to the men’s ones, and ranks can be equivalent. A restoration would likely see a lot more women join the armed forces, and would have far more successful, fulfilling and safe careers, if they served in separate institutions.

A more equitable way to do this might be to recreate women’s services and give female recruits the option of serving in either, with movement between them administratively possible. Ultimately, sex integration was a peacetime ideological luxury. Now that combat effectiveness is once again a national priority, it is no longer a luxury we can afford.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War we have seen a gradual bureaucratisation and feminisation of the armed forces, micromanaged largely by civilian bureaucrats and politicians pushing DEI agendas. The drop-off in public engagement and the purging of the military from civilian life has contributed to a militarily illiterate civilian population, while demoralisation agendas have encouraged young people to be ashamed of our country and its achievements. Meanwhile, non-whites would sooner return to the place of origin than fight for Britain in a war.

By gradually abolishing the concept of nation and homeland, we find that few are in any rush to fight and die for borderless multicultural neoliberalism. For there to be national defence, there must be a nation. As such, restoring our culture is as pivotal to our defence as choosing the right weapons of war.